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The Computer Forensic Tool Testing (CFTT)
project at the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) has been active since
2000. The project develops methodologies for
testing computer forensic software tools by the
creation of general tool specifications, test
procedures, test criteria, and test data sets. The
results provide the information necessary for
toolmakers to improve tools, for users to make
informed choices about acquiring and using
computer forensics tools, and for interested
parties to understand the capabilities of such
tools. Our approach for testing computer
forensic tools is based on well-recognized
international methodologies for conformance
testing.
Introduction
In 1999, members of US law enforcement involved in
investigating computer crime approached NIST about
the verification of the tools used to acquire and
analyze digital evidence. This was partially motivated
by the US Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The decision
established four criteria that a trial judge may use to
assess the admissibility of expert witnesses’ scientific
testimony. One of the four criteria involved testing the
theory or technique used by the expert witness. The
CFTT project was created to provide independent
testing of the software tools used in digital forensics
and thereby address the need for the testing of tools.
The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) published the
first test report in August 2002. Since then, as of
August 2010, a total of 75 test reports have been
published.
The Computer Forensics Tool Testing (CFTT) program
is a joint project of the National Institute of Justice
(NIJ), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
and the National Institute of Standards and
Technology’s (NIST’s) Law Enforcement Standards
Office (OLES) and Information Technology Laboratory
(ITL). CFTT is supported by other organizations,
including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S.
Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center, U.S.
Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation
Division Electronic Crimes Program, the Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement and U.S.
Secret Service. Representatives from each agency
form a steering committee that provides project
guidance, technical support, and selects tools for
testing. The objective of the CFTT program is to
provide measurable assurance to practitioners,
researchers, and other applicable users that the tools
used in computer forensics investigations provide
accurate results. Accomplishing this requires the
development of specifications and test methods for
computer forensics tools and subsequent testing of
specific tools against those specifications. A
secondary objective is to provide assistance and
resources to forensic practitioners for doing their own
testing of forensic tools. This is accomplished by
making test requirements, test plans, test tools and
test data available for general use.
Test results provide the information necessary for
developers to improve tools, users to make informed
choices, and the legal community and others to
understand the tools’ capabilities. The CFTT approach
to testing computer forensic tools is based on well-
recognized methodologies for conformance and
quality testing. Specifications and test methods are
posted on the CFTT Web site for review and comment
by the computer forensics community.2
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Test methodology 
There are several significant challenges to testing
forensic tools. These include the lack of agreement on
what capabilities a tool should offer, the lack of
agreement on what should be done in some
situations, and the rapid evolution of technology.
Some tools are designed to do a single task, such as
acquire all data on a device. Other tools are designed
like a Swiss army knife with a multitude of features.
Write block devices protect secondary storage from
modification by allowing some commands to be
passed from the host computer to the storage device
while blocking other commands. Different blockers do
not agree on what commands should be allowed or
blocked. When the CFTT project began there were two
widely used interfaces to secondary storage: ATA and
SCSI. Ten years later, as the technology has evolved,
the testing of tools also needs to accommodate SATA,
USB, Firewire and Thunderbolt interfaces.
CFTT organizes testing by forensic function rather
than by the specific type of tool. This allows test
development to focus on a group of related issues
together. Some forensic functions are critical to the
integrity of any acquired evidence. If the acquired
data is not accurate, then any analysis result is
suspect. Initially, CFTT began with two functions: disk
imaging and write blocking.
Disk imaging is the acquisition of all digital data
present on a secondary storage device. Write blocking
is used to control access to secondary storage such
that no changes are written to the storage device.
Write blocking can be accomplished either in software
or with a hardware device. Other forensic functions
identified by CFTT for tool testing include mobile
device examination, forensic media preparation
(erasure for reuse), string searching, live memory
acquisition, metadata based deleted file recovery, file
carving (signature based deleted file recovery) and
first responder triage tools. This is not a complete list
of possible functions, just the candidates under active
development for testing by CFTT.
The CFTT testing process is directed by a steering
committee composed of representatives of the law
enforcement community. The steering committee
selects tool functions for test method development
and the specific tools for testing by members of staff
at CFTT. After a forensic function is selected, CFTT
takes several steps in preparation for testing:
1. CFTT obtains some of the more widely used tools
that offer the forensic function that has been
selected.
2. CFTT develops a list tool features related to the
selected function offered by the tools. Some
features may be designated optional.
3. CFTT, with input from forensic practitioners,
develops a set of requirements for each related
tool feature, describing the desired tool
behaviour. A requirement is a statement about
something a tool must do. Requirement
development becomes challenging if there is no
widely held agreement on tool behaviour. In this
case, the requirement is written such that
multiple behaviours are allowed, with the actual
behaviour noted in the tool test report. Another
important consideration when writing
requirements is the ability to test each and every
requirement.
4. A draft set of requirements is published on the
CFTT web site for public comment. After the
closure of a comment period, the comments are
addressed and the requirements are finalized.
5. CFTT develops a test plan. This is often the most
complex and demanding step in the process.
Several components need to be developed for the
test plan, including test assertions, method for
measuring the test assertion, tools to measure
conformance of a test run to test assertions, test
data sets, tools for the creation of test data and
test cases. A test assertion is a simple statement
about one condition that must be true after
running a test case. Every test assertion must
trace back to at least one requirement and every
requirement must generate at least one test
assertion. If a requirement does not generate any
assertions, it cannot be tested and should be
removed. A test case usually bundles several test
assertions together for a single test run.
6. A draft test plan is published on the CFTT web site
for public comment. After the closure of a
comment period, the comments are addressed
and the test plan is finalized.
Once a test plan has been created, tool testing can
begin for tools selected by the steering committee.
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1. CFTT obtains the latest version of the selected
tool.
2. CFTT compares the features offered by the tool to
the features listed in the test plan and selects test
cases for each of the features offered by the tool.
3. CFTT develops a set of tool specific procedures for
executing each selected test case.
4. CFTT executes the test cases. Any unexpected
results are checked and possibly rerun. In some
cases the vendor of the tool is contacted to
ensure that the tool was used as designed by the
vendor.
5. CFTT writes a draft test report documenting the
test results.
6. The steering committee reviews the draft test
report.
7. The draft test report is sent to the tool vendor for
review. This allows the vendor to catch any errors
CFTT has made in testing and allows the vendor
time to fix any problems found by CFTT before the
test report is published.
8. CFTT submits the report to NIJ. NIJ reviews the
test report and publishes the report on the NIJ
web site.
The final tool test report is intended to provide the
information necessary for toolmakers to improve
tools, for users to make informed choices about
acquiring and using computer forensics tools, and for
interested parties to understand the tools
capabilities. A test report is generally divided into five
sections. The first section is a summary of the results
from the test runs. This section is sufficient for most
readers to assess the suitability of the tool for the
intended use. The remaining sections of the report
describe how the tests were conducted, discuss any
anomalies that were encountered and provide
documentation of test case run details that support
the report summary. Section 2 gives justification for
the selection of test cases from the set of possible
cases defined in the test plan for the tested tool. The
test cases are selected, in general, based on features
offered by the tool. Section 3 describes in more depth
any anomalies summarized in the first section.
Section 4 lists the hardware and software used to run
the test cases with links to additional information
about the items used. Section 5 contains a description
of each test case run. The description of each test run
lists all the test assertions used in the test case, the
expected result and the actual result.
Table 1 summarizes the number of test reports
published for each type of tool tested by year of
publication as of July 2011. Seven other test reports
are in final editing steps before final publication later
in 2011. Six additional tools are currently undergoing
testing with test reports to follow either in 2011 or
2012.
Year Disk Write Media Mobil Total
imaging block prep device
2002 1 1
2003 3 3
2004 1 4 5
2005 3 3
2006 13 13
2007 1 7 8
2008 6 4 4 14
2009 2 2 1 4 9
2010 2 6 9 17
2011 1 1 2
Total 17 33 7 18 75
Table 1 Number of test reports published by year and tool type
Lessons learned and test results by
forensic function 
This section describes lessons learned developing
requirements, test assertions and test plans along
with notable test results, presented by forensic
function.
Disk imaging
Disk imaging is the process of acquiring digital data
from a secondary storage device, referred to as the
source. The basic process is simple. Read the source
and make a copy on a destination device. To make a
copy in a forensically sound manner is another story.
A typical acquisition usually proceeds as follows:
1. A source storage device is obtained as evidence.
This is usually a hard drive or a removable storage
device. All devices are accessed through a
hardware interface. On older devices this is
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usually ATA or SCSI. On more recent devices the
interface is usually SATA or Thunderbolt.
Removable devices are usually USB, Firewire or
eSATA. Other interfaces are possible, but CFTT has
not tested any tools using them.
2. The source device must be attached to a
computer for copying. The computer may be a
single purpose device just for imaging or a
general-purpose computer, either a desktop or a
laptop. Some protection needs to be in place to
prevent any changes to the source. The protection
may be in the form of a write block device. The
device must be attached through some interface
and the host must use some interface to obtain
access to the device. The interfaces may be
different if there is a write blocker between the
storage device and the computer. In this case the
write blocker must translate commands from one
interface to another.
3. The imaging tool executes to produce a copy of
the source. The copy may be in one of two forms,
either a clone on to another device, or an image
file in some format. Often an image file is
compressed to occupy much less space than the
source.
Disk imaging testing 
The two fundamental requirements are to acquire the
source completely and accurately. Additional
requirements include making no changes to the
source, making a record of any deviations from
completeness and accuracy, and having a method to
validate the contents of the acquisition.
The disk imaging requirements and test plan
document, called collectively the specification, has
gone through three versions. The first version was
used to test a single tool and then significantly
revised. The second version of requirements and test
plan was used for testing four tools. At this point,
several shortcomings became apparent and the
requirements and test plan were again revised. One of
the reasons for the revision was the pace at which the
technology changed. The first two specifications were
tied to the ATA and SCSI interfaces. Each test case
specified the interface required for the test. With the
introduction of USB and with Firewire, it became clear
that a more flexible approach was needed. The
original specification would have a set of test cases
such as the following:
01 Make a clone of an ATA drive.
02 Make a clone of a SCSI drive.
03 Make an image of an ATA drive.
04 Make an image of a SCSI drive.
05 Make an image of a FAT partition.
06 Make an image of an NTFS partition.
Etc.
When USB was introduced, there was no test case
specified to use that interface. The test plan at least
needed to be revised to include cases for the USB
interface. However, it would be inconvenient to make
frequent revisions to such fundamental documents.
Instead, CFTT decided on a more flexible approach by
parameterizing the test cases. The new test cases are
as follows:
01-X Make a clone of a drive using interface X.
02-X Make an image of a drive using interface X.
03-Y Make an image of a type Y partition.
Etc.
Now test case 01-X can be executed once for each
interface the tested tool supports. New interfaces can
be introduced with no effect on the requirements and
test plan.
Test results 
The following is a list of some of the tool behaviours
we have seen. Some behaviours are serious errors,
but most are just quirks that the forensic practitioner
should take note.
1. Source drive is changed. This can be quite
serious, because it calls into question the
evidence that is acquired. In an ideal case, a write
blocker should always be used. However, the
specific situation of the acquisition may preclude
such use. Some tools are designed to function
without a write block device. These tools are often
designed to execute from a Linux boot CD that can
be configured to not modify any storage devices
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that are attached. The configuration of the boot
CD is complicated, and if not done correctly,
subtle changes can occur. One possibility is if
there is a swap partition on the source device. The
Linux run environment will use a swap partition
unless the boot CD is configured to ignore any
swap partition. Another problem is with NTFS
partitions; some Linux device drivers may change
NTFS metadata regardless of the mount status of
the partition and may make changes even if the
partition is not mounted. Note that the tool per se
is not the cause of the problem, but rather the run
time environment.
2. Acquisition fails to be complete or accurate over a
specific interface. The acquisition may be
successful over most interfaces, but fail to be
accurate or complete over some specific interface
or set of conditions. Examples are a tool that
imaged a laptop drive in place over a PCMCIA
interface, and an older tool imaging a SCSI drive
with a specific type of SCSI card installed in the
imaging computer.
3. Acquisition is incomplete. Older versions of Linux
used a block size of 1024 bytes and did not
acquire the last sector of a device or partition if it
contained an odd number of sectors. Another
situation where an acquisition is often incomplete
is when there are hidden sectors present on a
storage device. There are two methods for hiding
sectors on ATA and SATA drives: host protected
area (HPA) and device configuration overlay
(DCO). Manipulation of DCO and HPA areas is easy
to do, but the knowledge of how to do it is
obscure and arcane.
4. NTFS partition acquisition is incomplete and
inaccurate. Some tools do not bother to acquire
the last few sectors of an NTFS partition because
those sectors are not used to contain user data. In
one case, a block of sectors that had already been
acquired replaced these unused sectors.
5. Readable sectors are omitted from an acquisition
if bad sectors are present. If a sector is faulty or
unreadable, a tool should notify the user and
replace the unreadable data with benign data
such as zeros. There are several variations seen
on this theme. For drives connected via an ATA
interface and imaged from a Linux platform, seven
readable sectors surrounding a bad sector are not
acquired. Reading a device is done within the
operating system in blocks of eight sectors. If one
sector within the block is unreadable, the entire
block is treated as unreadable and replaced with
zeros. If another interface is used instead, a
larger, variable size block is replaced with zeros.
In other environments, the data not acquired is
not replaced with zeros, but with something of
undetermined origin.
6. A restore is incomplete. A common feature of
most imaging tools is the capability to restore a
previously acquired image file to a secondary
storage destination. Some tools that use a
Microsoft Windows run time environment may not
restore all of the data acquired from the source to
the destination. This can happen if the source
device and the destination device are identical in
size.
7. There are changes to the restored data. If a
partition (also known as a logical drive) is
restored from a Microsoft Windows run time
environment, some of the file system metadata is
modified during the restore. These changes can,
in some cases, be avoided by removing the
destination device as soon as the restore finishes.
This prevents the operating system from making
the changes to metadata because the actual
changes are often not written until the normal
shutdown is initiated.
Write blocking 
The basic idea of write blocking is to put a filter
between the storage device and any program that
might try to write to the storage device. The filter can
be either software that monitors access to the
interface connected to the protected device, or a
hardware device that sits between the computer and
the storage device.
The normal way a computer reads and writes to a
storage device is to issue a command over an
interface connected to the device. There are several
interface types, the main ones are ATA and SCSI.
Some interfaces, such as USB, use a restricted set of
SCSI commands to communicate. Both ATA and SCSI
interface command sets have several commands that
can be used to write to a storage device, and several
read commands. Different operating systems may use
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different commands to obtain access to secondary
storage. This means trying to test a write blocker by
using the normal system programs available to a user
to try to write to a protected drive is not likely to send
more than one or two write commands over the
interface. Such a test is incomplete.
Write blocker testing 
The CFTT approach to testing hardware write blockers
is to develop a tool that can issue all possible
command codes for both the ATA and the SCSI
interface. In addition, a special hardware device, a
protocol analyzer, is located between the computer
and the blocker along with a second protocol analyzer
located between the write blocker and the storage
device. The protocol analyzers monitor the command
traffic both going in and coming out of the write
blocker. This gives a clear indication of the commands
that are allowed and the commands that are blocked.
A similar approach was used to test software write
blockers that monitored the BIOS interface. The early
BIOS interface had two write commands: WRITE and
WRITE LONG. The software write blocker was able to
insert itself just in front of the BIOS to intercept all
commands that obtained access to the secondary
storage. The write blocker would examine each
command and pass along to the device any command
that was not a write command; write commands
would then be ignored. Later versions of the BIOS
interface added a third write command for addressing
larger drives.
There were two basic requirements in the first draft
of the specification:
01 Allow all read commands.
02 Block all write commands.
The second draft of the specification revised the first
requirement as follows:
01 Allow at least one read commands.
Test results 
Some read commands are blocked. The first hardware
write blocker tested blocked not only all write
commands, but any read command that was dropped
from the current interface specification. For example,
the ATA command specification has evolved over eight
versions, adding new commands and dropping others.
The write blocker replaces some read commands
with a different command.
A write command is allowed. This was seen in a
BIOS interface software write blocker. When a new
write command was added to the BIOS of newer
computers, the old write blocker did not know that
the new command should be blocked. This highlights
a fundamental design decision for write blockers.
There are more than just read and write commands
implemented on a given interface. Some command
codes are not assigned any function currently, but
may be assigned to new read or write commands in
the future. One design is block writes, allow
everything else; the other is allow reads, block
anything else. There can be problems with both
designs.
Forensic media preparation 
Forensic media preparation is the erasing of a drive
for reuse within the organization. This is not to be
confused with erasing a drive for disposal or transfer
to another organization. The idea is to remove
information to prevent cross contamination from one
case to another, not try to prevent extraction of
previous content by extraordinary means.
Drive wipe testing
ATA and SATA drives have a special instruction,
SECURE ERASE, defined for wiping drives. The
implementation is optional. If SECURE ERASE is not
implemented, the drive can be overwritten with other
content. Some tools offer both methods. Some tools
also offer multiple overwrites with user selectable
patterns and wipe verification. CFTT did not find either
of these options testable in a practical way for most
implementations. To test multiple overwrites, the
state of the drive would need to be examined at the
end of each pass. This could be done, but at the
expense of significant effort. Given that a single pass
is adequate for the purpose at hand (reuse within the
same organization), it would not be cost effective to
develop test procedures to test this feature. As for
testing post wipe verification, the process would need
to be stopped after the wipe phase so that the wipe
could be corrupted before starting the verification
phase. Otherwise, there is no verification that wipe
failure would be detected. As for a tool that writes
random data to a drive, it should be pointed out that
random data is difficult to distinguish from encrypted
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3 Hyperlinks for each test report are listed at
www.cftt.nist.gov/mobile_devices.htm.
data. A tool that claims to write random data might
just encrypt existing data unless the tool has a
mechanism to provide assurance that the data really
is random.
Test results
SECURE ERASE fails to function. The implementation
of SECURE ERASE in particular drives is sometimes
not what the tool developer expected and the
invocation of the command fails.
Hidden sectors (HPA or DCO) are not erased.
Sometimes this is a design decision to ignore hidden
sectors. Sometimes the tool would attempt to remove
the hidden sectors, but fail to remove the sectors.
Sometimes the tool will remove the hidden sectors,
but not erase them.
Mobile devices 
The development of mobile device forensic tools and
acquisition techniques continues to develop within
the field of digital forensics. Mobile subscribers far
out number personal computer owners, and studies
have shown an increase of mobile device personal
data storage compared to personal computers. At the
time of writing, four times the number of mobile
subscribers exists compared to the owners of
personal computers. Higher-end mobile devices
present users with advanced features and capabilities
similar to those of a personal computer. Mobile
devices provide users with the ability to maintain
contact information, future appointments, day to day
activities, inform us of important news events and
provide us with the ability to correspond with friends
and family via text message, e-mail, chat and social
networking sites. Over time, mobile devices can
accumulate a sizeable amount of information about
their owner. Data acquired from these devices may be
useful in criminal cases or civil disputes.
While the use and sophistication of mobile devices
continues, so does the need for the validation of
tools. In order for the information acquired from such
devices to be admissible in legal proceedings,
verification of a tools behaviour and strict forensic
acquisition methods are paramount. Potentially, one
piece of data acquired from a mobile device may play
a critical role in shedding light on an incident or
possibly criminal activity. The need for rigorous
testing conducted on a combination of forensic tools
and specific families of mobile devices is critical for
providing law enforcement and forensic examiners
informative test results yielding known expectations
of the behaviour, capabilities and limitations of a tool.
Over the past three years, the CFTT project at NIST
has tested numerous mobile device forensic tools that
are capable of acquiring data from mobile devices
operating over Global System for Mobile (GSM)
communications and Code Division Multiple Access
(CDMA) networks.
Test results 
The CFTT project has currently tested many versions
of thirteen mobile device forensic tools capable of
acquiring data from SIMs, the internal memory of
GSM and CDMA devices. As of 2011, this testing has
resulted in a total of nineteen documents providing an
overview of the test results.3 The test reports
describe how the tests were conducted and provide
documentation of test case run details that support
the report summary.
Mobile device forensic tools have continued to
improve, providing forensic examiners with
acquisition solutions for multiple devices operating
over various cellular networks. As new mobile devices
continue to enter the market, tool updates often
introduce problematic areas in software and
hardware. Over the years of testing mobile device
forensic tools, anomalies within tools tend to reoccur,
such as the following:
1. Lack of Unicode support – Address book entries
and/or text messages containing non-ASCII
characters are not displayed in their native
format.
2. Truncated entries – Long address book entries or
text messages over 160 characters are partially
acquired.
3. Connectivity issues – Connectivity between the
mobile device and the forensic workstation or the
mobile device forensic tool is not established.
4. Acquisitions ending in errors – Acquisitions
abruptly ending due to connectivity errors
between the mobile device and mobile device
forensic tool resulting in an unsuccessful acquire.
5. Incorrect date/time stamps – Incorrect date/time
stamps for call logs and text messages.
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6. Inconsistencies between preview-pane data and
generated reports – Data inconsistencies between
what is presented in the preview-pane compared
to the generated report.
7. Subscriber related data not reported (IMEI,
MSISDN) – Subscriber data either incorrectly
reported or not acquired.
8. Deleted data acquisition – Unsuccessful recovery
of recoverable deleted data objects.
9. Internet related data – Unsuccessful acquisition of
Internet related data.
10. Application related data – Unsuccessful
acquisition of application related data.
Recovery of deleted files
The specification for metadata based deleted file
recovery tools is currently under development. The
recovery tool uses file system metadata that remains
after a file is deleted to recover allocated blocks and
file attributes. Each file system leaves different pieces
of metadata behind, so the tool needs to be tested on
each file system and significant versions of the file
system. CFTT is focused on the following file systems:
FAT12, FAT16, FAT32, NTFS, Ext2, Ext3 and Ext4. The
HFS+ file system is ignored because when a file is
deleted from HSF+ all metadata is deleted. No formal
testing has been completed, but we have some partial
results. For example, consider a fragmented file that
has been allocated two blocks, X and Y. Suppose the
blocks are separated by an allocated file A. The block
layout of just those three blocks would be XAY. Three
tools have given three different results. Tool 1 returns
just block A. Tool 2 returns both blocks X and Y. Tool 3
returns blocks X and A. It can also be shown that if
the layout is more complicated, tool 2 is not always
correct. If the layout adds block Z from another
deleted file such that Z is between A and Y, XAZY, then
tool 2 returns XZ as the recovered file.
Errors and Daubert 
In addition to testing as a criterion for admissibility of
scientific testimony, Daubert includes an error rate for
the technique. At first glance, it would seem useful to
try to derive error rates from the test results. However,
it is not obvious how to describe the error rates for
digital forensic tools. The Daubert decision motivates
attempts to establish error rates for digital forensic
tools. The legal decision in 1993 by the Supreme
Court of the United States indicates four criteria that a
trial judge may use to assess the admissibility of
expert witnesses’ scientific testimony during federal
legal proceedings:
1. Whether the theory or technique has been tested,
2. Whether the theory or technique has been
subjected to peer review and publication,
3. Whether there is a known or potential rate of error
and whether standards exist to control the
technique’s operation, and
4. Whether the technique has general acceptance
within the relevant scientific community.
Establishment of an error rate for using digital
forensic tools is complicated by the difference
between the underlying algorithm or technique and
its implementation in software and process. For
example, consider picking up a deck of cards that
have been dropped in a room. The theoretical error
rate for picking up the cards is zero because there is
no reason why all the cards cannot be picked up.
However, the dealer may introduce an implementation
error into the process by not checking under furniture.
Providing none of the cards fall under the furniture,
there are no errors. The condition of cards under
furniture allows the error (not systematically checking
under furniture) to be manifest.
For digital forensic software tools there are three
broad sources of error that can occur in using a tool:
1. The algorithm intended for the process.
2. The software implementation of the algorithm.
3. The performance of the process by a person in a
specific situation.
There are two issues (not one) related to error rates of
forensic evidence: (1) does the technique work? (2)
Did the expert do it right?
For the first question, the issue is scientific validity
of the technique. The intent is to filter out testimony
based on bad science and pseudoscience. No
astrology, water witching, cold fusion or contact with
the spirit world is allowed into court. The error rate for
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a Daubert hearing is about the science. For example,
what is the error rate for using a hash or checksum to
determine if two files are identical? If an expert wants
to offer an opinion about two files based on a 4-bit
CRC checksum, the court should not allow the
testimony to be admitted, since the error rate is two
high (1 in 8). If an expert wants to offer an opinion
about two files having the same content based on his
own hash algorithm that almost no one else has seen,
but some of the people that have seen it claim that it
is easy to generate files that have a given hash value,
then this too is not admissible (untested, not
reviewed, not accepted). On the other hand, the SHA1
algorithm is open for independent review and has a
known error rate that is vanishingly small for
determining if two files are the same.
The second question is about the specific expert
opinion at hand. Was the technique implemented
correctly? An error rate can be calculated here too, but
with less certainty due to the number of independent
variables. For digital evidence, the relevant
parameters that make for systematic error have too
much variation for a meaningful error rate to be
constructed based on empirical testing.
For many forensics applications, the error rate for
the algorithm is zero. For example, the copying
techniques and algorithms that underlie disk
acquisition have an error rate so small that for all
practical purposes it is zero. The software
implementation may have an error rate as well as the
performance of the examiner. For example, the
software may not correctly handle drives with an odd
number of sectors, or the examiner may fail to follow
correct procedure.
Software is more likely to contain systematic errors
rather than random errors that can be described using
an error rate. Systematic errors are normally seen in
software errors (cases where the code is incorrect)
and in cases where software is asked to do something
it was not programmed to do. The software might
appear to act randomly in these situations, but, most
likely, the underlying cause can be explained as a
software flaw and the behaviour is logical; that is, it
follows the logic of the (poorly written or misused)
software. It is therefore, systematic and does not have
an associated error rate.
The main issue is whether the software algorithm is
implemented correctly and is appropriate for the
given situation. For example, software to copy a drive
needs to be able not only to copy, but to be able to
handle the type of drive being used, to know what to
do if the drive contains unreadable sectors, to know
what to do if the drive being copied to is smaller than
the source, and many other factors. Within the
constraint that the software can handle the situation,
the error rate is that of the physical attributes of the
hardware and creates an error rate that is
infinitesimal and not useful. To address this, the tool
must be tested. Therefore, requiring an error rate is
not relevant – what is needed is a test report.
Summary and conclusions 
The CFTT project has been writing tool requirements,
test plans and testing forensic tools for the last 10
years. In general, the results are correct for the critical
functions the tools are asked to do. Some serious
errors have been found, and the tool vendors have
been able to correct the problems quickly. Most of the
problems are just quirky behaviours that can be
avoided if the practitioner is aware of them.
Over the next few years CFTT will expand into
testing other functional areas such as string
searching, live memory acquisition, triage tools and e-
mail extraction. Another area will be to try to make
the CFTT testing methodology available to forensic
laboratories in a form that is easy for a laboratory to
test forensic tools in a common manner and to
facilitate sharing of test results and test materials.
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